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be taken, an arrangement to use the average error made by the subject seems preferable in many cases.

I may note also that to give only differences and permit only judgments of more . . . or less . . . relieves the experimenter from very annoying elements in the latter calculations and on the whole seems better than to allow judgments of 'equal.' The author's instructions vary on this point.

The chapter on statistical methods gives the standard formulæ with illustrations of their calculation. It is made specially useful by including the later short methods of calculating correlations. I regret that the author accepts Pearson's speculative assumption that to compare the variabilities of two series each gross variability should be divided by the corresponding central tendency. No one method of rendering the variabilities of the same group in different traits or different groups in the same trait comparable is universally valid, and certainly not the method of dividing by the central tendency. Dividing by the square root of the central tendency will be more often and more nearly right.

The summaries of work done and the bibliographies accompanying them represent a scholarly heroism all of whose sins of commission and omission will readily be pardoned by any one who has tried to do the like. The only serious fault, I think, is in quoting as measures of correlations, figures got before the effect of the variable errors of the original deviation-measures in reducing the obtained correlation from the true correlation toward zero had been discovered by Spearman. The obtained correlations of Aikins, Thorndike and Hubbell and Wissler were thus necessarily far too low. Mr. Whipple's interest in the generally neglected subject of correlations also leads him to mislead the ordinary reader by quoting resemblances of related individuals in the same trait along with the resemblances of a person's degree of ability in one trait to his ability in another. The former should be carefully explained if quoted at all in such connection.

It is to be hoped that this book and the reports that are being issued by the American Psychological Association's committee on tests will be studied and used by every investigator of human intellectual performance here and abroad. The earlier expectations from tests of human faculty on the basis of the faculty psychology, being too great, were destined to disappointment, but now that the complexity, variability and relative independence of mental functions are being understood and allowed for, we may hope for a revival of interest in inventories of individual intellects, in measuring the changes which they undergo by growth and training, and the causes of their original capacities. If Professor Whipple's work did nothing more than stimulate other investigators to measure the reliability of his tests, their susceptibility to practice effect and their value as symptoms of more general conditions, and so to amend or even replace them, it would have abundantly justified itself. It will do much more than this.

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The Phenomenology of Mind, by G. W. F. HEGEL. Edited, with an introduction and notes, by J. B. Baillie. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910. 2 volumes. Vol. i, pp. xlv., 427; vol. ii, pp. viii., 429-823.

In Professor J. B. Baillie's recent translation we have now before us Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* in an adequate English dress. The Teuton has so far failed to make anything worth while out of this unique intellectual product from a fellow-member of his race. It is now handed over to a more distant relative, but perhaps none the less close still to the central intellectual tendencies of the Germanic races for the *rapport* necessary to its understanding, in a form to make it more readily accessible, and so to give the Anglo-Saxon a turn at its interpretation. As is, in part, implied in these two sentences, we shall probably have to approach the translation,

which as adequately represents the original as this is possible in a translation, on the assumption that it is only a means to an end, for two reasons. First, the genius of language, reflecting the habits of thought of a race, is sufficiently diverse in the English and the German to require a closer adaptation of the methods of presentation than a mere translation affords. Secondly, Hegel's presentation is, in fact, inadequate to begin with, and naturally so because he had undertaken a task to which there were no established precedents other than mere vague effort; and the great bulk of modern scientific work giving a training in accurate formulation has all come after him, so that his work needs first of all to be modernized. But the present translation will now unite the efforts of interpretation over a greatly extended area.

In a brief appreciation of such a book as the present there are perhaps essentially two things of interest to the reader. First comes the question as to the purpose of the book, and as to whether its preparation is adequate to the purpose. Second, and of equal importance would, in the present instance, probably be additional suggestions calculated to enhance the value of the book. The first has probably been sufficiently considered above; to the second we might now give a little more attention. In general, the cynical aspersion on Hegel's work of its being an intellectual travesty cannot satisfy an impartial mind upon a glance at the table of contents and a mere superficial perusal of the text of the *Phänomenologie*. Particularly, great emphasis is everywhere put on the unity of all matter of experience, and on the need of taking fully into account the presuppositions implied in our expositions in science through this unity of all matter of experience. This receives practically no attention in present-day science, while its recognition would bring about a far reaching revolution in science. To get into Hegel's analysis in the present work, a very close study of his Introduction, with all the implications, is advisable for the necessary point of view. This point of view is not that experience as a whole must be explained in terms of some single definite conception, as idealism, monism, materialism, psychophysical parallelism, and so on; but that these very conceptions themselves are all elements in the form of stages in this experience, while the single fact of experience as a distinct conception is nothing for us. Perhaps due largely to its subject-matter, the English rendering of the Introduction is particularly good, so that not even an original re-formulation in the English could improve it much. One suggestion might here be made, which has reference more especially to the genius of the English language and the Anglo-Saxon habit of mind. If in place of the abstract noun representing completed action the present participle of continuing action were more generally used, or if the reader will more generally supply the sense of a continuing for that of a completed action, the representation of the original would be more exact; as for instance near the top of page 78, by putting for *die Darstellung des erscheinenden Wissens*, "the presentation of a developing knowing" instead of "the exposition of knowledge as a phenomenon." This will make awkward English, but it more adequately represents the continuous flux of conceptions as necessary to understand Hegel, contrasting with the fixedness or permanent demarcation of conceptions in the English.

It might be to the point to consider this flux of conceptions in Hegel's method a little farther; and the real nature of this flux is best shown by its formal recognition in the antinomy. In the antinomy, we have a contrast of two mutually exclusive or incompatible appearances of the same matter of experience of such a nature that one of them complete and distinct, but only one, is necessarily present while the other is impossible for the time being. Upon close examination and analysis of the appearance present, however, it literally dissolves, as if by magic, under our very eyes; and its contrasting opposite appears and immediately takes its place. Moreover, only at the completion of the actual perversion are the full meaning and all

implications of each of the two forms of appearance of the experience wholly understood. Classic among such antinomies are those regarding the nature of motion in our environment developed among the ancient Greeks; regarding the innateness of ideas, developed by ways of reaction between Descartes and Locke; regarding the nature of the reality of the matter of our experience, developed by Berkeley and Hume; and the cosmological antinomies of Kant. Besides these particular instances, the antinomy can, however, be found permeating our experience everywhere. Through it is revealed an actual single inner movement and unity, in the universe as it surrounds us, totally different from the cosmic motion of the Copernican system and not recognized in present-day science but which alone will account for such perplexing phenomena as the action of force at a distance. The fixedness of conception, then, as most characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon mind, here invariably leads to confusion and a sense of loss of reality with the passing of the forms present, because the continued presence simply of the fixed forms is taken to be the reality, while philosophical analysis invariably shows that the forms cannot be so retained. The Introduction, from page 82 to 89 of the translation, read in the light of this suggestion, may prove to be of more value, reference being had not only to the fact of flux, but also to the mode of flux, of conceptions.

Furthermore, Hegel in his analyses exhibits a kind of pedagogical ungainliness, which borne in mind will explain and clear up no small part of his obscurity. So the following summary may serve to guide and elucidate. The "Meaning" in the section heading on page 90 of the translation should be understood in the sense of "Supposing;" for this beginning section, subordinated under the general head of Consciousness, is a discussion of the *sinnliche Gewissheit eines gemeinten Dingen*, the sensations or sensuous awareness of a supposed this as apart by itself, over against the knowing, which is the beginning of all conscious knowledge. The next sub-section under the head of Perception (page 104) examines the development and nature of the unities in things, under another aspect also called universals, as essentially forming the basis of our conceptions of the nature of things. The third sub-section under the head of Understanding (page 124) discusses the formation of a continuous scheme of things constituting our conception of the nature of things and consisting of two fundamentally distinct parts or elements, the physical occurrence or fact of experience, and the apprehensive content or metaphysical part in an Aristotelian sense. Following these three sub-sections under the general heading of Self-consciousness (page 163) is shown the mode of appearance of a persisting self possible only through a succession of antinomies or course of antinomic dialectic. The preceding sub-sections show the essential elements in ordinary knowing in their more or less independently distinct character; in this section we have these elements, mutually dependent, forming an indissoluble system. The rest of the work, beginning with a section under the head of Reason (page 220), then shows how out of the movement of successive reactions between the antinomic moments, in a single movement, of a persisting self knowing and an other than the self known, develops the comprehensive structure of science, the conventionalized conscious content of our experience. A closing section under the head of Absolute Knowledge (page 800) then considers various characteristic incidents of the independent absolute form attained in our experience by the foregoing mode of analysis.

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De l'origine et de la nature mnemoniques des tendances affectives. Par E. RIGNANO. Estratto da "Scientia": Rivista di Scienza. Vol. 9. Anno 5 (1911). N. XVII. 1. Traduit par le Prof. J. Dubois. 35 p.

In this article the author outlines a genetic theory of the affective states. The term affective is restricted to the special category of organic tendencies